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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
H. GLENN OLSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK-CRAIG-OLSON, INC., 
SAMUEL PARK, and ELLIS 
EDWARD CRAIG, 
Defendants. 
J- ! 
i AFFIDAVIT OF 
) JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS 
| Case No. 900056 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm of Suitter 
Axland Armstrong & Hanson, counsel for Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 
and J. Samuel Park, defendants in this action, and have personal 
knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. I represented defendants Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. 
and Park at the hearing on the plaintiff's renewed motion for 
partial summary judgment, which was held in Judge Moffat's 
chambers on August 29, 1989, and at which an active dialogue 
concerning the full range of issues before the court was conducted 
between Judge Moffat and counsel to the parties. No court re-
porter was present at the hearing. 
3. Although the bulk of the hearing was directed to 
the plaintiff's motion to dismiss Park's counterclaim, the parties 
also addressed the plaintiff's renewed motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
4. At the hearing, and in accordance with paragraphs 
19 and 20 of our Answer wherein we denied plaintiff's allegations 
of apportioning co-guarantor liability by percentage of stock in 
the obligor corporation, I argued that the court, in the event 
it was inclined to grant plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss our Coun-
terclaim, should require each of the three co-guarantors—Park, 
Craig and Olson—to pay one-third of the corporation's obligations 
rather than apportioning liability according to their respective 
ownership interests in Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this 10 day of October, 1990. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the fore-
going Affidavit of Jeffrey Weston Shields was mailed, postage 
prepaid thereon, this \0TVN day of October, 1990, to the 
following: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Bryce D. Panzer, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 45000 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84145 
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INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff, H. Glenn Olson, brought this action 
seeking contribution from defendant J. Samuel Park and indemnity 
from defendant Park-Craig-Olson, Inc. ("PCO") for amounts he 
paid to First Security Bank (the "Bank") on a debt of PCO's that 
he and Park had guaranteed. The debt that Olson paid was only 
a small part of PCO's obligations, most of which had been jointly 
guaranteed by Park, Olson and defendant Ellis Edward Craig. 
When it became apparent that PCO was in dire financial straits, 
Park spent many hours of his own time and his own money in ob-
taining releases of the jointly guaranteed obligations and in 
negotiating a sale of PCO's assets in order to save the indivi-
duals' investment in PCO. He did so without contribution from 
Olson or Craig. When Olson sought contribution from Park for 
the relatively small amount Olson had been required to pay, Park 
asserted that he had a set-off, which he pled as a counterclaim 
for unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim 
and granted Olson summary judgment against all defendants. Park 
and PCO have filed this appeal. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Park and PCO do not dispute most of Olson's Statement 
of Facts. However, they do dispute Olson's assertion that Park's 
actions in negotiating arid obtaining each of the releases directly 
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or indirectly benefited Park.1 Park obtained Olson's release as 
a guarantor on the lease of the West Valley City store without 
being released himself. Park also negotiated the cancellation 
of the sublease on the Arcadia store even though he had not guar-
anteed that sublease and thus was not personally liable for it. 
There is no evidence that either of these actions benefited Park 
in any way. 
Park also disputes Olson's assertion that he was re-
imbursed by PCO. See Record ("R.") at 86 f 12. He was reimbursed 
by Marie Callender Ventures, Inc. as part of the sale of PCO's 
assets. See R. at 141-42 f 3 & 182. 
1
 Although Park and PCO do not dispute certain other allega-
tions, they are at a loss to understand their significance. 
For example, Olson alleges that, when he filed his complaint, 
the Bank had released its claims as against Park, Craig and PCO. 
This fact would appear to be significant only in that it would 
bar any subrogation claim Olson might have against the defendants. 
If the Bank had no claim against the defendants, because it had 
released all its claims, then Olson could acquire no such claim 
when he stepped into the Bank's shoes. 
Park also disputes the significance of the fact that 
his counterclaim sought contribution from Olson for 16.67 percent 
(not one-third) of Park's expenditures in trying to save PCO. 
Park was only trying to give Olson the benefit of any doubt as 
to the proper apportionment. Park was not so much interested 
in obtaining a money judgment as he was in showing that he had 
paid far more toward satisfying PCO's obligations than Olson 
had, and 16.67 percent of Park's expenditures would virtually 
offset Olson's claim for contribution. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Olson first argued that this court should not consider 
some of the defendants' arguments because they were not raised 
below. Not only were some of those arguments in fact raised 
below, but, on the facts of this case, the court should exercise 
its discretion to reach all of the defendants' arguments (point 
I)-
Contrary to Olson's assertion, Park's counterclaim 
stated a claim for relief for unjust enrichment (point II). 
Olson was not entitled to recover his attorney fees 
from PCO because the only basis for a fee award that he has al-
leged, Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415, does not apply to this case 
(point III). 
Finally, Olson was not entitled to summary judgment 
against Park because Park had paid more than his share of the 
jointly guaranteed debt and Olson had paid less than his share 
(point IV). 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT CAN CONSIDER ALL OF THE APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS. 
Olson argues that certain of the defendants' arguments 
should not be considered because they were raised for the first 
time on appeal. Specifically, Olson argues that the court should 
not consider the defendants' arguments (1) that Park was not 
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liable for contribution because he had paid more than his share 
of the debt, (2) that Olson was not entitled to contribution 
because he had not paid more than his share, his share being 
one-third of the total debt, (3) that the court erred in calcu-
lating the amount of contribution, and (4) that Olson was not 
entitled to attorney fees incurred in the Bank's action because 
he had not shown that he became a guarantor with the consent or 
through the fault of PCO. 
The defendants recognize that appellate courts gen-
erally will not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal. E.g., Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 
743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). Contrary to Olson's assertion, 
however, some of the issues were raised below. The first issue 
(regarding Park's reimbursement) was raised below. See R. at 
86, 100, 197-98 & 218-19. The second issue (regarding Olson's 
share of the debt) was also raised below. In answer to Olson's 
complaint, Park specifically averred that no right of contribution 
in proportion to the individual shareholders' percentage interests 
in PCO existed. R. at 88-89 HI 19 & 20. At oral argument on 
Olson's renewed motion for summary judgment, counsel for Park 
argued that the three co-guarantors should each be liable for 
one-third of the total obligation rather than having their li-
ability for contribution determined according to their respective 
interests in PCO. See Affidavit of Jeffrey Weston Shields J 4 
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(filed herewith).2 Thus, the trial court had an opportunity to 
consider the issue of Olson's share of the jointly guaranteed 
obligation,^ and this court should consider the issue on appeal. 
Even if the first two issues were not raised below in 
the terms in which they have been stated on appeal, broadly speak-
ing, they were raised below. The whole theme of Park's defense 
in the trial court was that the court should consider the total 
picture, which showed that Park had expended far more than his 
share in time and money in rescuing PCO and saving the investment 
of PCO's shareholders. Therefore, Park argued, in equity he 
should not be liable for contribution to Olson, who had refused 
to contribute to Park's efforts yet who readily accepted the 
benefits of Park's services. Thus, the first two issues were 
raised below, at least in general terms. 
2
 This court has recognized that an argument may be pre-
served for appeal if raised orally in a hearing on a motion for 
summary judgment. Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 1987). In Busch the parties did not 
contend that the omitted arguments were raised below, nor was 
there anything in the record to support that possibility. Id. 
Mr. Shields' affidavit distinguishes this case from Busch. 
3 The trial court granted Olson's renewed motion for 
summary judgment based on the grounds found in Olson's original 
motion. R. at 483. In his initial motion, Olson argued that 
he was entitled to contribution from the co-guarantors according 
to their respective interests in the corporation. Id. at 100. 
Thus, at a minimum the trial court implicitly considered the 
issue of the co-guarantors' proportionate shares of liability 
and adopted Olson's position on that issue. 
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Even if the first two issues were not raised below, the 
court should reach them for another reason. The general rule 
that an appellate court will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal is subject to certain exceptions. Speci-
fically, the rule does not apply when the issue concerns a party's 
right to maintain the action. See, e.g., Blodaett v. Zions First 
Nat'l Bank, 752 P.2d 901, 904 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (either party 
or the court on its own may properly raise standing for the first 
time on appeal); In re A.H. Robins Co., 681 P.2d 540, 542 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1984) (accord); Mitchell v. Doe, 41 Wash. App. 846, 
706 P.2d 1100, 1102 (1985) (the insufficiency of the facts to 
support standing may be raised for the first time on appeal). 
A guarantor's right to maintain an action for contribution against 
a co-guarantor depends on whether or not the plaintiff has paid 
more than his proportionate share of the debt and on whether 
the defendant has paid less than his share. See, e.g., Gardner 
v. Bean, 677 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1984); Restatement of Security 
§ 149 (1941); Restatement of Restitution S 85 & comment e (1936). 
The first two issues—whether Park had paid his share of PCO's 
debt and whether Olson had paid more than his share—go directly 
to Olson's right to maintain this action and therefore can be 
raised for the first time on appeal. 
The fourth issue (Olson's entitlement to attorney fees 
incurred in the Bank's action against the guarantors) was also 
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raised below. The defendants argued that Olson had asserted no 
basis for an award of attorney fees, R. at 533, although ad-
mittedly they did not make the specific argument that no attorney 
fees could be awarded because there was no evidence that Olson 
became a surety with the consent or because of the fault of PCO. 
But then Olson did not argue that he was entitled to attorney 
fees because he had become a surety through PCO's consent or 
fault. In fact, he did not allege any basis for an award of 
his attorney fees except Utah Code Ann. § 7QA-3-415, which, at 
best, entitles him to fees incurred in this action, not the Bank's 
action. As the party moving for a fee award, he had the burden 
of establishing the basis for such an award. Because he has 
asserted no basis either below or on appeal for his fees incurred 
in the Bank's action, this court can reverse that fee award with-
out reaching the specific argument the defendants have made. 
The defendants raised the argument on appeal only to show that 
the only possible basis for a fee award, though not argued below, 
was in fact not supported by the record. 
The court should also consider the third issue, namely, 
the proper computation of the judgment against Park. The issue 
merely requires a mathematical calculation, assuming all the 
facts and law in Olson's favor. Where, as here, a request for 
or objection to a finding as to the amount of the judgment is 
not required, see Utah R. Civ. P. 52, and the appellate court 
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can determine that an error has been made from the trial court's 
computation in the record, the court can correct the error, even 
if it was not raised below. See Clarke's Trucking Co. v. Land 
Mat. Servs., Inc., 278 Or. 153, 562 P.2d 976, 978 (1977). 
Even if none of the defendants' arguments were raised 
below, this court can still consider them. The general rule 
precluding appellate review of issues raised for the first time 
on appeal is not based on any lack of power in the reviewing 
court. See, e.g. , 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Error § 545 at 30 
(1962). The court, in its discretion, may decide a case on any 
point that its proper disposition may require, even if it was 
never raised either in the trial court or on appeal. See, e.g. , 
Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah 1987); Acton v. 
J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 n.4 (Utah 1987); Romrell v. Zions 
First National Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). Accord Falk 
v. Keene Corp. , 113 Wash. 2d 645, 782 P.2d 974, 982 (1989); White 
v. Fisher, 689 P.2d 102, 105 (Wyo. 1984). 
Courts have considered various factors in deciding 
whether to exercise their discretion to consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal. Those factors include the follow-
ing: whether the issue affects a litigant's substantial rights, 
Cottrill v. Cottrill Sodding Serv., 229 Mont. 40, 744 P.2d 895, 
896 (1987); whether failure to address the issue would propagate 
plain error, Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc., 
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787 P.2d 109, 115 (Alaska 1990); State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 
35 (Utah), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); whether or not 
the issue is dependent on any new or controverted facts or, on 
the other hand, whether it presents only a legal question arising 
on proven or admitted facts, 787 P.2d at 115; Fuiioka v. Kam, 
55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568, 570 (1973); Taco Bell v. City of Mis-
sion , 234 Kan. 879, 678 P.2d 133, 137 (1984); the extent to which 
the arguments are related to the parties' trial court arguments 
or could have been gleaned from the pleadings, 787 P.2d at 115; 
and whether the parties have briefed the issue, Three Rivers 
Land Co. v. Maddoux, 98 N.M. 690, 652 P.2d 240, 243 (1982), over-
ruled on other grounds, Universal Life Church v. Coxon, 105 N.M. 
57, 728 P.2d 467 (1986), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987). The 
defendants submit that these factors justify this court's review 
of all the issues raised on appeal, even if those issues were 
not properly raised below. 
An issue affects a parties' substantial rights if the 
error was prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence the result would have been dif-
ferent. See, e.g., State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35; State v. 
Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989). £f. Utah R. Civ. P. 
61. The first two issues that Olson claims were not raised below 
clearly affected the defendants' substantial rights because there 
is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the alleged errors, the 
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result would have been different. Before a co-guarantor, such 
as Olson, is entitled to contribution, he must show that he paid 
more than his share of the debt guaranteed and that the defendant 
paid less than his share. Neither was the case here. See Brief 
of Appellants at 9-15. Olson was therefore not entitled to con-
tribution, and but for the errors, the result would have been 
different—no judgment would have been entered against Park. 
Similarly, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
result (specifically, the amount of the judgment) would have been 
different if the court had considered issues 3 and 4. The amount 
of the judgment against Park should have been some $25,000 less, 
see Brief of Appellants at 15-17, and the judgment against PCO 
should not have included Olson's attorney fees incurred in the 
Bank's action. 
Moreover, the errors raised by the first three issues 
should have been obvious to the trial court. The court could 
not say that Olson had paid more than his share of the debt or 
that Park had not paid his share without knowing what the total 
debt was. Nowhere in the record did it say what the total debt 
was. The Bank's complaint asked for judgment in the principal 
amount of $226,189.51 plus interest. R. at 17. The record showed 
that Park had paid the Bank $235,000. Id. at 248-49. This should 
have virtually extinguished the debt to the Bank. Thus, Olson 
should not have been liable to the Bank, and he would have had 
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no claim for contribution or indemnity. On the record before 
it, it should have been obvious to the trial court either that 
Olson was not entitled to contribution because the debt for which 
he sought contribution had already been paid or that the record 
was insufficient to establish Olson's right to contribution.^ 
See Brief of Appellant at 10. Similarly, it should have been 
plain to the trial court that the judgment against Park was too 
high since the effect of the judgment was to relieve Olson from 
liability for all but 4 percent of the total amount paid, well 
below the 16.67 percent Olson claims was his fair share. See 
id. at 15-17. Not to reach the issues that the defendants have 
raised would propagate the trial court's plain error and deny 
the defendants' substantial rights. 
Third, the issues that Olson would like this court to 
ignore do not depend on any new or controverted facts that would 
require development in the trial court. How much the guarantors 
paid is undisputed. The first two issues—whether Park paid 
less than his share and whether Olson paid more—present only 
legal issues arising out of this undisputed fact. With respect 
to the defendants' claim that Park paid more than his share, 
4
 In fact, Olson's claims were based on three debts that 
PCO owed the Bank, not just the two notes that the Bank sued 
on. Only by aggregating the three debts could the trial court 
determine the total debt and Park's and Olson's proportionate 
shares thereof. Nowhere in the record is there any evidence of 
the third obligation. 
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the only issue is the relevance of the fact that Park was later 
reimbursed. With respect to the defendants' claim that Olson 
paid less than his share, the only issue is whether the co-guaran-
tors ' shares should be apportioned equally or in accordance with 
their percentage of stock ownership in PCO. Similarly, the de-
fendants ' argument that the trial court erred in calculating 
the amount of contribution only requires a mathematical calcu-
lation based on undisputed figures.5 
With respect to the fourth factor that courts consider 
in exercising their discretion to reach issues not raised below, 
the first and second issues the defendants have raised could 
have been gleaned from the pleadings. It appeared from the plead-
ings that the Bank was owed $226,189.51 plus interest, R. at 
17, and that Park had paid the Bank $235,000, R. at 248-49. 
Thus, it appeared from the pleadings that Park had paid more 
than his share of the debt and that any amounts Olson paid in 
excess of his share were not owed to the Bank and thus could 
not provide the basis for any claim for contribution. At the 
very least, it should have appeared from the pleadings that, if 
Olson had a claim at all, the record was not sufficient to support 
his claim. Furthermore, the defendants' claim that the court 
5 Olson's entitlement to attorney fees incurred in the 
Bank's collection action also presents only a legal issue—whether 
there is sufficient evidence in the record to show that Olson 
became a guarantor with the consent or because of the fault of 
PCO. 
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erred in calculating the amount of contribution could also have 
been gleaned from the pleadings since the calculation was based 
solely on figures contained in the pleadings. The fourth issue 
—whether there was sufficient evidence that Olson became a guar-
antor with the consent or because of the fault of PCO—could 
also be gleaned from the pleadings because, on the motion for 
summary judgment, the only evidence before the trial court was 
that contained in the pleadings. 
Finally, Olson has briefed issues 1, 2 and 4 regarding 
the propriety of summary judgment against Park and the award of 
attorney fees against PCO. See Brief of Appellee at 14-19. 
Thus, the court has the benefit of the parties' arguments on 
those issues, making resolution of those issues appropriate. 
II. 
PARK'S COUNTERCLAIM STATED A CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF IN QUANTUM MERUIT. 
Park argued, both in the trial court and on appeal, 
that his counterclaim stated a claim for relief under a theory 
of quantum meruit, specifically one for unjust enrichment. His 
counterclaim could be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
only if it appeared "to a certainty" that he "would be entitled 
to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in 
support of the claim." Christensen v. Lelis Automatic Trans-
mission Serv., Inc.. 24 Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605, 607 (1970). 
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The Utah Court of Appeals has stated the elements of 
a claim for unjust enrichment as follows: "(1) the defendant 
received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or knowledge by the de-
fendant of the benefit; (3) under circumstances that would make 
it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying 
for it." Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Olson concedes that, at this stage of the proceedings, 
Park's counterclaim meets the first element. He disputes, how-
ever, the second two elements. 
With respect to the second element—Olson's knowledge 
or appreciation of the benefit conferred—Olson concedes that 
"it may be appropriate to infer" from the facts Park has alleged 
that Olson knew he was being released from his guaranties, but 
he claims that it is "an unjustified leap of faith" to conclude 
that he appreciated that the benefit was being conferred by Park 
rather than PCO, the principal obligor. Brief of Appellee at 
12. 0 he of little faith. All the allegations of the counter-
claim and of Park's affidavit, which the court was required to 
accept as true and construe in the light most favorable to Park,** 
See, e.g., Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 
622, 624 (Utah 1990); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988); Ellis v. Social Servs. Dep't 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 
1250, 1252 n.l (Utah 1980). 
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indicate that Park personally set out to save the PCO enterprise,' 
R. at 404 f 14; 247-48 II 11 & 12; that Park (not PCO) negotiated 
the cancellation of or Olson's release from the guaranteed ob-
ligations, id. at 406 I 17 & 408 I 18; that Park (not PCO) sought 
Olson's help but could not obtain it, id. at 405 I 15; that Olson 
received the benefit of the releases from Park (not PCO) or 
through Park's efforts and expenditure of funds, id. at 250 I 
15 & 254 I 16; and that Park personally gave Olson consideration 
far in excess of the amount Olson claimed in contribution, id. 
at 250 I 15. The only reasonable inference to be drawn from 
these allegations is that Olson knew or should have known that 
the benefit was conferred by Park, not PCO. Even if one could 
reasonably infer that the benefit was conferred by PCO, on Olson's 
motion to dismiss the court was required to draw all reasonable 
inferences in Park's favor. Colman, 795 P.2d at 624; Arrow 
Indus., 767 P.2d at 936; Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1252 n.l. 
Olson next argues that it would not be unjust for him 
to retain the benefit of Park's services without paying for them 
because Park was acting for his own advantage and would have 
furnished the services in any event. The fact that Park may 
have been motivated in part by his own interests and may have 
benefited from his actions does not necessarily mean that he is 
7
 When Park first advanced funds to save PCO, in August 
1987, he was not even a shareholder of PCO and thus could not 
have been acting on PCO's behalf. See R. at 400 I 7 & 404 I 14. 
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not entitled to restitution. See, e.g., Restatement of Resti-
tution §§ 81, 103 & 112 (1937). Section 112 of the Restatement 
of Restitution states: 
A person who without mistake, coercion or 
request has unconditionally conferred a bene-
fit upon another is not entitled to resti-
tution, except where the benefit was conferred 
under circumstances making such action neces-
sary for the protection of the interests of 
the other or of third persons. 
(Emphasis added.) Contrary to Olson's assertion, Park's claim 
comes within the exception and not within the rule stated in 
section 112. Park's actions were necessary to prevent the loss 
of PCO's assets. Because Park's actions were necessary to protect 
the interests of Olson and Craig, the other PCO shareholders, 
as well as his own, it would be unjust for Olson to retain the 
benefit of Park's services without paying for them.8 
Olson argues that Park has not stated a claim for unjust 
enrichment because any benefit to him was "incidental" to services 
that Park performed for his own advantage. This argument assumes 
that Olson's release from liability as a guarantor on numerous 
PCO obligations was simply a by-product of Park's efforts to 
secure his own release. But Olson's release did not necessarily 
8 Similarly, under section 103 of the Restatement, a person 
is entitled to contribution if, in preventing the lawful taking 
of his things, he discharges the duty of another in whole or in 
part. In acting to prevent the lawful taking of his own assets 
by PCO's creditors, Park discharged duties that Olson and Craig 
owed as co-guarantors of PCO. 
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follow from Park's release, as the transaction with the Bank 
shows* When Olson refused to cooperate with Park in resolving 
the Bank's claims, Park negotiated a settlement with the Bank 
that released all obligers except Olson. Park could have left 
Olson exposed to liability on the other jointly guaranteed obli-
gations as well. Thus, Olson's release was not simply a by-prod-
uct of Park's efforts to secure his own release and to negotiate 
the sale of PCO. 
Moreover, Olson ignores the fact that Park secured 
Olson's release from contingent liability for two obligations 
where Park received no corresponding benefit. First, Park secured 
Olson's release from liability as a guarantor of the lease on 
the West Valley City store even though the landlord required that 
Park remain personally liable as guarantor on that lease. Second, 
Park secured Olson's discharge from liability on his guaranty 
of the Arcadia store sublease, even though Park was not a co-
guarantor of that lease and had no personal liability with respect 
to that obligation. 
Under the circumstances of this case, where Park 
expended large amounts of his own resources not only to save 
the shareholders' investment in PCO but also to secure Olson's 
release from contingent liability on numerous obligations for 
which Park could have left him personally liable, it would be 
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unjust to allow Olson to accept the benefits of Park's services, 
as he has, without paying for them.9 
III. 
OLSON WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER HIS 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
Olson was entitled to recover his attorney fees incurred 
in the Bank's action against him only if he became a guarantor 
with the consent or because of the fault of PCO. Restatement 
of Restitution § 80 & comment d. Olson does not dispute this 
principle. Brief of Appellee at 14. Moreover, he does not dis-
pute that the record contains no direct evidence as to whether 
or not Olson became a guarantor with the consent or through the 
fault of PCO. Rather, he argues that, under the facts of this 
case, "it can hardly be argued that PCO did not know and agree 
to Olson's becoming a surety." Although this may be a permissible 
y
 Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 
P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), which Olson relies on, is distinguishable 
from this case. The court in that case simply held that, where 
the plaintiff's performance of a contract with a third party 
confers an incidental benefit on the defendant, who was not a 
party to the contract, the third party's breach of contract, 
without more, does not give rise to a claim against the defendant 
for unjust enrichment. In this case, any benefit to Olson was 
unrelated to Park's performance of any contract with another 
and hence not merely incidental within the meaning of Commercial 
Fixtures. Moreover, the only authority cited for the court's 
holding in Commercial Fixtures—66 Am. Jur. 2d, Restitution and 
Implied Contracts § 16 (1973)—appears to support the opposite 
result in that case, leaving one court to say of the case that 
,fthe dissent may well be considered more persuasive and impressive 
than the views of the majority.•• Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Co., 
713 P.2d 776, 781 (Wyo. 1986). 
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inference on the facts of this case, on Olson's motion for summary 
judgment PCO was entitled to have all reasonable inferences drawn 
in its favor, see, e.g., Pavne ex rel. Payne v. Mvers, 743 P.2d 
186, 188 (Utah 1987), and it is at least reasonable to infer 
from the absence of evidence that PCO was not responsible for 
Olson becoming a guarantor. 
More importantly, the burden was on Olson, as the moving 
party, to show his entitlement to attorney fees, and he has of-
fered no basis for an award of his fees incurred in the Bank's 
action against him.1^ 
The defendants also argued, below and on appeal, see 
R. at 533; Brief of Appellants at 28-30, that Olson was not en-
titled to his attorney fees incurred in this action. Olson argues 
that section 3-415 of the Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-3-415, entitles him to recover such fees. It states: 
"An accommodation party is not liable to the party accommodated, 
and if he pays the instrument has a right of recourse on the 
instrument against such party." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-415(5). 
Olson's argument ignores the clear language of the statute, which 
defines an "accommodation party" as "one who signs the instrument 
. • . for the purpose of lending his name to another party to 
*0 The only basis for a fee award he has alleged is a 
right of recourse on the Bank's notes, see infra, which provide 
for an award of fees. But the notes would only entitle Olson 
to fees incurred in an action to enforce the notes, that is, in 
Olson's action against PCO, not the Bank's action against Olson. 
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it." Id. S 70A-3-415(l) (emphasis added). It is undisputed 
that Olson did not sign the instruments that he claims gave him 
his right to attorney fees, namely, PCO's notes to the Bank. 
Thus, he is not an "accommodation party," and is not entitled 
to attorney fees under the statute. 
Olson argues that, because guarantors are sureties, 
they are also accommodation parties under section 3-415. Brief 
of Appellee at 15 (citing Kennedy v. Bank of Ephraim, 594 P.2d 
881, 884 (Utah 1979), and Murray v. Pavne, 437 So.2d 47 (Miss. 
1983)). Although an accommodation party is a surety, not every 
surety or guarantor is an accommodation party. The guarantor 
must have signed the promissory note, either as a maker or an 
indorser, to be considered an "accommodation party" under the 
UCC. See U.C.C S 3-415 official comment II 1-2 & 4. "A separate 
guaranty agreement does not fall with the ambit of the Uniform 
Commercial Code." Uniwest Mortgage Co. v. Dadecor Condominiums, 
Inc. , 877 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord University Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Dunton, 655 F.2d 23, 24 (1st Cir. 1981). The 
notes in this case do not incorporate the guaranties,11 and the 
guaranties make no reference to the notes but guaranty all of 
1 1
 Although the notes refer to "sureties" and "guarantors" 
thereof, see Record at 19 & 22, "a descriptive 'reference' [to 
a guaranty] is not the equivalent of substantive incorporation" 
and does not bring the guaranty within the ambit of article 3 
of the UCC. 877 F.2d at 434. 
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PCO's indebtedness, present and future, up to $550,000, well in 
excess of the amount of the two notes sued on. 
The two cases that Olson relies on admittedly held that 
guarantors who signed separate guaranty agreements were accommo-
dation parties within the meaning of section 3-415. However, 
neither court expressly addressed the argument made here. To 
the extent that these cases hold that a guarantor who does not 
sign the instrument can still be an accommodation party, they 
are clearly contrary to the statutory language, to the scope of 
article 3 and to the clear weight of authority. See Uniwest, 
877 F.2d at 434 and cases cited therein. 
Because Olson has not cited to any other statute or 
contract that entitles him to attorney fees, the trial court 
erred in awarding him his attorney fees. 
IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING OLSON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HIS CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION. 
Olson argues that he was entitled to contribution from 
Park because Park had not paid his proportionate share of the 
obligation, despite the fact that Park paid over 73 percent of 
the total obligation, well over his alleged 54.33 percent share. 
Olson argues that the court should ignore Park's payment because 
he was later reimbursed as part of the sale of PCO's assets to 
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Marie Callender Ventures, Inc.*2 Olson cites no authority for 
the proposition that Park's substantial payment should be 
ignored.13 
The only effect that PCO's reimbursement of Park has 
on the co-guarantors' respective rights of contribution in this 
case is to cut off Park's right of contribution from Olson. It 
does not give Olson any right to contribution from Park. Cf. 
Restatement of Restitution § 85 & comment c:; Restatement of 
Security § 154(4). 
Olson argues that Park's position is nonsensical and 
unfair because it would permit unfair manipulation of a corpora-
tion's finances by a controlling shareholder. Obviously, if a 
controlling shareholder were to abuse his position, the law would 
1Z
 Olson ignores the fact that the reimbursement came from 
Marie Callender Ventures and not from PCO. 
*3 Olson quotes comment e to Restatement of Security § 
154, which says: 
The amount of the proportionate shares for 
which cosureties are liable among themselves 
is affected by the extent to which the prin-
cipal himself performs. This is true whether 
the principal's partial performance is before 
or after the surety's performance. 
The obvious effect of comment e is to give the cosureties credit 
for any payment that their principal makes to reduce the debt. 
Here, the co-guarantors' liability was reduced by PCO's payments 
to the Bank before it defaulted (just as Olson's liability was 
reduced by Park's $235,000 payment). That is the only application 
that comment e has in this case. After PCO defaulted, it did 
not "perform" its obligation to the Bank. 
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not be powerless to protect minority shareholders• But that is 
not this case. 
On the other hand, Olson's position would punish Park 
for voluntarily paying more than his share of the debt. Because 
Park paid more than his share, he could have sought contribution 
from Olson. Instead, he sought reimbursement. Had he not been 
successful, Olson would not now be entitled to contribution. 
But because Park was successful, Olson would now have Park pay 
a second time and seek reimbursement a second time. And presum-
ably, under Olson's theory, if Park were to pay 54.33 percent 
of Olson's judgment and then be reimbursed again, Olson could 
sue Park again for 54.33 percent of any amounts for which Olson 
had still not been reimbursed, ad infinitum. Where is the fair-
ness in this? 
If there is any unfairness at all, it is only because 
Park has been reimbursed and Olson has not. But that is a matter 
between Olson and PCO, not between Olson and Park. The defendants 
do not dispute that Olson has a good claim for indemnity against 
PCO, as did Park. But the fact that Olson has not yet been indem-
nified should not negate the fact that Park paid more than his 
share of the debt, precluding Olson's claim for contribution. 
Olson also claims that he is entitled to contribution 
because he has paid more than his share of the debt, his share 
being based on his percentage of ownership in PCO. The defendants 
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concede that there is a split of authority on this issue and no 
Utah precedent. Olson states that M[t]he search is for a legal 
presumption that will apply in most instances," and that the 
better presumption is that co-guarantors of a corporate debt 
have impliedly agreed to share the debt in the proportions of 
their stock ownership at the time the guarantees are executed." 
Brief of Appellee at 18 & 19. Apart from the fact that Olson's 
position appears to be the minority rule, the presumption should 
not apply in this case for several reasons. First, the court 
need not imply an agreement to share the debt in proportion to 
the co-guarantors' stock ownership because the co-guarantors in 
fact agreed to be equally liable for PCO's debt. Each agreed 
to be jointly and severally liable for PCO's indebtedness to 
the Bank up to $550,000. R. at 124-26. Had they intended to 
share the debt in proportion to their stock ownership, they would 
have limited their liability accordingly. The fact that they 
did not shows that they intended to be equally liable. See, 
e.g., Curtis v. Cichon, 462 So.2d 104, 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985). 
Moreover, a rule of equal contribution is more con-
sistent with the nature of the guarantors' liability. Park, 
Craig and Olson agreed to be liable for PCO's indebtedness re-
gardless of their status as shareholders in PCO. Their liability 
arose from the guaranty agreements, not from their ownership of 
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PCOf and Park in fact remained personally liable on his guaranty 
even after he sold his stock in PCO in January 1985• From 1985 
to September 1987, when he repossessed his shares in PCO, Park 
received no benefits from PCO or from the obligations he had 
guaranteed. Thus, even if Olson were correct, on the facts of 
this case the court should conclude that the presumption of un-
equal liability has been overcome and that each co-guarantor 
was equally liable on PCO's notes to the Bank. Absent proof 
that Park benefited disproportionately from the Bank loans, the 
co-obligers should be required to contribute equally as among 
themselves. Harris v. Handmacher, 185 111. App. 3d 1023, 542 
N.E.2d 77, 80 (1989); 18 Am. Jur. 2d Contribution § 22. Because 
Olson did not pay more than one-third of the total debt to the 
Bank, he was not entitled to contribution from Park. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should reverse the judgment of the trial 
court except to the extent that it grants Olson judgment against 
PCO for the amount he paid to the Bank and should remand this 
case to the district court for further proceedings. 
- 25 -
DATED this iQ™ day of October, 1990. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
BRENT R. ARMSTRONG, Esq. 
JEFFREY W. SHEILDS, Esq. 
PAUL M. SIMMONS, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellants 
(Original signature) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four true and correct copies of 
the above and foregoing Appellants Reply Brief was mailed, postage 
prepaid thereon, this ^*H day of October, 1990, to: 
Reed L. Martineau, Esq. 
Bryce D. Panser, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Appellee 
10 Exchange Place #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TflMX 7\A. /&W>VvvtnAA 
(Original signature) 
PS12.10 
- 26 -
